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3Introduction
The idea to review the 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), put forward
notably by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and Swedish Foreign Minister Carl
Bildt, did not meet with universal enthusiasm. While not everybody was con-
vinced that the ESS was already in need of updating, some also feared that too
divisive debates would be provoked, particularly on Russia, and that the EU
would end up with a worse rather than a better document. Hence the somewhat
cautiously expressed – and grammatically slightly awkward – mandate given to
High Representative Javier Solana by the December 2007 European Council:
“to examine the implementation of the Strategy with a view to proposing ele-
ments on how to improve the implementation and, as appropriate, elements to
complement it”.
Just like in 2003, when the draft of the original ESS was discussed, the EU Insti-
tute for Security Studies organized a series of seminars, in Rome, Natolin, Hel-
sinki and Paris, in June-October 2008, to debate the implementation of the ESS
with academics and policy-makers. All three of us were involved in one or more
of these seminars, and in Helsinki we constituted one of the panels, chaired by
Daniel Keohane of the EUISS. Our thanks go to the EUISS for inviting us to
participate in this exciting exercise.
The debate was concluded by the adoption of a Report on the Implementation
of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World by
the December 2008 European Council,1 which decided to leave the text of the
ESS itself untouched. The Report “does not replace the ESS, but reinforces it”
and the ESS remains in force.
The question now is: will actionable conclusions be drawn from the Report in
order to effectively improve implementation of the ESS? For even if one agrees
with the decision not to revise the ESS itself, problems of implementation there
undoubtedly are. If the process ends here, most observers will rightfully be dis-
appointed. This Egmont Paper summarizes what we see as urgent priorities for
the EU to address in order to fulfil its inevitable ambition of being a global
strategic actor.
Sven BISCOP, Egmont & College of Europe
Jolyon HOWORTH, Yale University
Bastian GIEGERICH, International Institute for Strategic Studies
1. See http://www.eu-un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf. 

5The European Security Strategy: Now Do It
SVEN BISCOP
Among officials from outside the EU and among academics, in the course of
2008 the “review” of the European Security Strategy (ESS), as it was often
called – although that was never the mandate given to Javier Solana by the
December 2007 European Council – generated great expectations. That in itself
is proof of the importance attached to the ESS.
That the European Council in December 2008, after a long debate – which not
coincidentally only really gained steam after the summer’s crisis in Georgia –
decided to leave the ESS untouched should in itself not be a reason for disap-
pointment. If the EU today is not the global power that it could have been, it is
not because its strategy is not valid, but because it has been half-hearted in
implementing it. All of the so-called new threats and challenges are already men-
tioned in the ESS. It could indeed say more about Russia, climate change or
energy, but adding a few words here and there is not what matters most – imple-
mentation does. If anything, the Georgian crisis confirms the EU strategy of
engaging global actors like Russia by pulling them into the multilateral system,
just like the financial crisis confirms the need – as if we did not know already –
for effective multilateral rules and institutions in the economic sphere.
This is not a call for complacency though. It is not sufficient to have a strategy
– one must then also do strategy.
A Report on Implementation
Rather than amending the ESS, which offers both a sound concept and an ambi-
tious agenda,2 the December 2008 European Council adopted a Report on the
Implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a
Changing World. Judging by the EU’s performance, according to the Report,
“despite all that has been achieved, implementation of the ESS remains work in
progress. For our full potential to be realised we need to be still more capable,
more coherent and more active”. The Report did not meet expectations for a
true strategic review however.
2. Sven Biscop & Jan Joel Andersson (eds.), The EU and the European Security Strategy – Forging
a Global Europe. Abingdon, Routledge, 2008, p. 4. 
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On the positive side, Solana did not allow the debate to be hijacked by the events
of August – strategy should not be about the last thing that happened to occur,
but about fundamental interests and principles and long-term objectives. The
Report provides a concise overview of implementation and confirms the holistic
and multilateral approach. Interestingly, it mentions human security: “We have
worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting
good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the
root causes of conflict and insecurity”. Absent from, though implicitly present
in the ESS, human security can be a useful organizing concept, binding every-
thing together and explaining the core aim of the EU’s holistic approach as a
global actor: making sure that every individual, everywhere, has access to phys-
ical security, economic prosperity, political freedom and social wellbeing. To
realize this for its own citizens is the fundamental interest of the EU; to realize
it for citizens worldwide is the means to safeguard that interest and, at the same
time, a positive agenda in its own right.
The Report ends with a firm call to action: “To build a secure Europe in a better
world, we must do more to shape events. And we must do it now”. But it offers
little in terms of concrete recommendations. Nor did the European Council pro-
vide a follow-up mechanism to ensure that implementation of the ESS would be
stepped up and the linkages between the ESS and decision-making enhanced.
That would require more political courage, more as well as better capabilities,
and, in a number of areas, the definition of clearer “sub-strategies”3 to the ESS.
As it is, the strategic objectives have – rightly – been reaffirmed in the Report,
but a number of fundamental questions remain as to how to achieve them.
Strategic Choices for the Implementation of the ESS
Global Crisis Management
EU Member States are certainly not averse to deploying their forces, but the
large majority is on the Balkans, where they logically assume responsibility, and
in Afghanistan and (for a long time) Iraq, interventions – one rapidly becoming
as controversial as the other – directly motivated by self-defence. The 7-8,000
European blue helmets in UNIFIL in Lebanon (since 2006) are a positive excep-
tion, but they contrast sharply with the 1,000 troops reluctantly deployed in the
Congo in 2006 and the apparent unwillingness to launch a new bridging oper-
3. Sub-strategy does not refer to a specific or new category of documents, but to documents that
elaborate on one aspect of the ESS and thus de facto function as sub-strategies to it, e.g. the ENP,
the strategies on WMD, on terrorism, on Africa etc.
EUROPE: A TIME FOR STRATEGY
7
ation in the east of the DRC in late 2008 (after Operation Artemis in 2003) in
order to avert a humanitarian catastrophe. Understandably perhaps – but not
necessarily justifiably – there is no will for an intervention in Darfur; in January
2008, after a very long force generation the EU “only” launched a bridging
operation to protect refugees in neighbouring Chad, until March 2009. Partici-
pation in UN operations other than UNIFIL (e.g. MONUC in the DRC) remains
minimal: in late 2008 the EU27, Lebanon set aside, accounted for less than
2,700 out of nearly 90,000 “blue helmets” or just under 3%.
Most Member States do put their forces in harm’s way, for national, NATO or
coalitions-of-the-willing operations. Yet although legally the EU’s Petersberg
Tasks include operations at the high end of the spectrum of violence, politically
the Member States are still extremely divided over the use of force under the EU
flag. It is striking that in a Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities, also
adopted by the December 2008 European Council, when setting out what the
EU should actually be capable of in the short term – “in the years ahead” – alone
of all “illustrative scenarios” elaborated by the EUMS, “separation of parties by
force” is not mentioned – the only scenario for larger-scale operations of longer
duration at the high end of the spectrum. Battlegroup-size rapid response oper-
ations of limited duration is the only high-intensity target listed. Even though
the EU has proven that it can mount high-risk operations if the political will is
present, most ESDP operations tend to be of lower intensity and smaller scale.
The still young ESDP needs to legitimize itself, hence the tendency to select oper-
ations with a large chance of success. To some extent therefore the criticism is
justified that the EU takes on important but mostly “less difficult” operations,
in the post-conflict phase, in reaction to the settlement of a conflict – a criticism
which can of course be applied to the international community as a whole. Nev-
ertheless one must question whether Member States are willing to fully accept
the implications of the strong EU diplomatic support for the “responsibility to
protect” (R2P),4 which if it comes to military intervention per definition implies
high-intensity operations; not mentioned in the ESS, R2P is included in the
Report though – a positive signal.
There are positive examples of EU engagement: UNIFIL, as already mentioned;
the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia, deployed at record speed on 1 October
2008 after President Sarkozy successfully brokered the Six-Point Agreement
between Moscow and Tbilisi; EULEX Kosovo, deployed in December 2008 in
4. Endorsed at the UN Millennium+5 Summit in September 2005, R2P implies that if a State is
unable or unwilling to protect its own population, or is itself the perpetrator of genocide, ethnic
cleansing, war crimes or crimes against humanity, national sovereignty must give way to a respon-
sibility to protect on the part of the international community. In such cases, the Security Council
must mandate intervention, if necessary by military means. 
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spite of Member States’ divisions about the recognition of Kosovo independ-
ence; and EU NAVFOR Somalia, deployed in the same month in order to safe-
guard trade routes against the threat of piracy off the Somali coast. In spite of
the global ambitions expressed in the ESS, Member States are reluctant though
to commit to long-term, large-scale operations outside their immediate periph-
ery or where no direct strategic interests are at stake – where “the risks are too
high and the stakes are too low”. There is more willingness to implement rapid
reaction operations of smaller scale and limited duration, or lower-intensity
operations, but for high-intensity operations Member States still habitually look
to other frameworks than the EU, even though it is obvious that these other
frameworks are not always willing or available to act.
Interestingly though, even when EU Member States deploy forces for non-EU
operations, the EU increasingly sells this as an EU contribution. This was clearly
the case for UNIFIL, which politically was decided upon in the Council, a fact
which was acknowledged by then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who
explicitly welcomed the EU contribution. The Report also mentions Afghani-
stan, where “EU Member States make a major contribution to the NATO mis-
sion”. This reflects the trend that the political centre of gravity is shifting. It has
notably shifted away from NATO, to what are in effect the Alliance’s two main
pillars, the US and the EU: the “complete” foreign policy actors, covering eve-
rything from aid and trade to diplomacy and the military. The EU has increas-
ingly become the political centre and the primary decision-making level for
European States: if they want to concert, it is in the EU that they decide whether
or not to act in a given situation. If their decision entails military action, the
secondary step is to select the organization through which to act – NATO, ESDP,
the UN, the OSCE, an ad hoc coalition – which will always be an ad hoc deci-
sion, if function of which partners want to go along and which organization is
best suited for the case at hand. That in the resolution of the Georgian crisis
NATO is all but a sideshow is further evidence of this trend.
The Elaboration of a Military Strategy?
If the EU’s engagement for global peace and security can be stepped up, there
are, sadly, too many conflicts and crises for the EU to deal effectively with all of
them, certainly in a leading role. Therefore, as the Report states, “We need to
prioritise our commitments, in line with resources”. The ESS is not very clear on
priorities for ESDP operations though, resulting in a missing link between the
overall political objective in the ESS – “to share in the responsibility for global
security” – and ESDP operations and capability development. Quantitatively,
ESDP is based on the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal, i.e. 60,000 troops. Not only
EUROPE: A TIME FOR STRATEGY
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has this objective been overshadowed by the much more limited battlegroup
project – although renewed emphasis is put on it in the above-mentioned Dec-
laration on Strengthening Capabilities – but the actual availability of the forces
declared cannot be assessed, as they are not pre-identified and Member States
have mostly declared similar numbers to NATO as well. If all ongoing ESDP,
NATO, UN and national operations in which EU Member States participate are
counted, Europe today deploys more than 80,000 troops, but EU Member
States obviously cannot mobilize 60,000 additional troops. It is equally obvious
however that even the combined ESDP and NATO level of ambition still falls
far short of the total combined armed forces of the EU-27: 2 million troops, on
which there is no grand vision, even if collective defence is taken into account.
What is required is a unified vision on the level of ambition, cutting across
organizational divides – whether operations are conducted through ESDP,
NATO, the UN or an ad hoc coalition, is secondary. The EU as the political
expression of Europe must decide on a military or civil-military strategy for
ESDP, a ‘white book’ that would function as a sub-strategy to the ESS: how
many forces should the EU-27 be able to muster for crisis management and
long-term peacekeeping, for which priorities, which reserves does that require,
and which capacity must be maintained for territorial defence. In all probability
the result will be that Europe does not need 2 million uniforms...
Elaborating such an ESDP strategy will require a thorough debate, but some
outlines can already be discerned. The EU is obviously very committed to the
region which it dubs its “Neighbourhood”, in which it seeks to promote politi-
cal, economic and social reform – it should also be a priority for ESDP if peace
and security in the region are threatened, as in Lebanon and Georgia. Sub-Saha-
ran Africa has been an important area of focus for ESDP until now, and should
probably remain so, for few other outside actors appear willing to contribute to
crisis-management on the African continent. Securing Europe’s lines of interac-
tion with the world, of which the operation off Somalia is an example, is another
priority. Importantly, the collective security system of the UN, and therefore the
EU itself, as its main supporter and with two permanent members of the Security
Council in its ranks, can only be legitimate if it addresses the threats to every-
one’s security – too much selectivity undermines the system. Even though it can-
not always play a leading role, the EU must therefore also shoulder its share of
the responsibility for global peace and security by playing an active role in the
Security Council and by contributing capabilities to UN crisis management and
peacekeeping operations. Notably if anywhere in the world the threshold to acti-
vate the R2P-mechanism is reached, the EU, in view of its support for the prin-
ciple, should muster the courage to contribute to its implementation. Once
defined, these priorities should guide a proactive engagement.
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All of these commitments require deployable military capabilities which the EU
is currently lacking. A substantial increase in deployments is only possible in the
medium to long term, in function of the ongoing transformation of European
armed forces. Member States should abandon the national focus: rather than at
the level of each individual Member State, the EU27 together must be capable.
A resolute choice for pooling, by reducing intra-European duplications, can pro-
duce much more deployable capabilities within the current combined defence
budget, notably in the framework of “permanent structured cooperation” as
provided for in the Lisbon Treaty.5
Permanent Prevention and Conditionality
The EU is very active in prevention and stabilization, via “positive conditional-
ity”, notably through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). By linking
them to market access and economic and financial support, the EU aims to stim-
ulate economic, political and social reforms as well as security cooperation, so
as to address the root causes and durably change the environment that leads to
extremism, crisis and conflict. Yet, if “positive conditionality” as a theory seems
sounds enough, practice is often lagging behind, certainly in countries that do
not – immediately – qualify for EU membership. The proverbial carrots that
would potentially be most effective in stimulating reform, such as opening up
the European agricultural market or setting up a system for legal economic
migration, are those that the EU is not willing to consider – in spite of imperative
arguments suggesting that Europe would actually benefit from such measures.
At the same time, conditionality is seldom applied very strictly. The impression
created is that the EU favours stability and economic – and energy – interests
over reform, to the detriment of Europe’s soft or normative power. Surprisingly
perhaps, in the Mediterranean e.g. public opinion mostly views the EU as a
status quo actor, working with the current regimes rather than promoting fun-
damental change.
This lack of EU soft power should not be underestimated. Rather than as the
benign actor which the EU considers itself, in many southern countries it is seen
as an aggressive economic actor. For many countries, the negative economic
consequences of dumping and protectionism – which often cancel out the posi-
tive effects of development aid – are far more threatening than the challenges of
terrorism and proliferation that dominate the western agenda. In the current
difficult international climate, the EU model is urgently in need of enhancing its
5. Sven Biscop, “Permanent Structured Cooperation and the Future of the ESDP: Transformation
and Integration”. In: European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 13, 2008, No. 4, pp. 431-448, http://
www.egmontinstitute.be/papers/08/sec-gov/080918-Biscop-Helsinki-paper.pdf. 
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legitimacy. The EU must therefore muster the courage to effectively apply con-
ditionality. Admittedly, “positive conditionality” requires an extremely difficult
balancing act, especially vis-à-vis countries with authoritarian regimes and vis-
à-vis great powers like Russia and China: maintaining partnership and being
sufficiently critical at the same time. But in that difficult context, the EU could
notably show more resolve in reacting to human rights abuses, which should
visibly impact on the relationship with any regime. A much enhanced image will
follow, which is a prerequisite for the gradual pursuit of further-reaching polit-
ical, economic and social reforms.
But has the EU really solved the dilemma of stability versus democracy? A
debate seems in order on the desired end-state of especially the ENP. The Report
mentions that the Mediterranean e.g. has still seen “insufficient political
reform” and that instability is rampant, but does not indicate the way ahead. Is
the aim incremental progress while maintaining the existing regimes, or full
democratization – and if the latter, are EU instruments sufficient or is there an
upper limit to what can be achieved via consensual tools such as the ENP? These
are questions which the new Union for the Mediterranean, although the further
institutionalization of the Barcelona Process which it entails is positive, does not
provide an answer to, and which the projected Eastern Partnership will have to
address as well.
Implementing the Holistic Approach
The ESS advocates a holistic approach, but have its objectives really been incor-
porated by all parts of the EU machinery? Is there sufficient coordination
between the different strands of foreign policy, across and within pillars, or is
“stove-piping” still the order of the day? The in fact very progressive agenda of
the ESS risks losing credibility if the EU does not draw the full conclusions from
it, notably for its external trade, agriculture and migration policies. If an exclu-
sive focus on hard security undermines effectiveness and legitimacy, so does e.g.
a one-dimensional focus on trade. The holistic approach cannot be efficiently
implemented without changes in the EU machinery. The personal union of the
High Representative and the Commissioner for External Relations, and the
European External Action Service provided in the Lisbon Treaty would allow
for the integration of the security, political, social and economic dimensions in
all foreign policies, from the creation to the implementation and evaluation of
policy. A High Representative with a stronger mandate would also strengthen
the EU’s capacity for preventive diplomacy and increase leadership in EU foreign
policy.
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Truly Strategic Partnerships
Implementing the holistic approach also requires the active cooperation of all
global powers. The UN collective security system can only work if all permanent
members actively subscribe to it and refrain from paralyzing or bypassing the
Security Council. Conditionality can only work if it is not undermined by actors
that disregard human rights and other considerations. Another debate therefore
is how the EU can persuade strategic partners like Russia and China, but also
India, Brazil, Mexico, and the US, that “effective multilateralism” is in their
long-term interest. Specific but concrete joint interests can perhaps function as
building-blocks to give real substance to the politico-military dimension of these
strategic partnerships. E.g. in the negotiations with Iran, Russia and China have
been difficult, but not impossible partners either, given that sanctions have been
adopted by the Security Council. At the same time, the growing importance of
these bilateral strategic partnerships must be reconciled with the other EU objec-
tive of promoting regional integration in other parts of the world.
A United Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship
One thing is clear: the EU can only have an impact if it acts as one. The EU
should abandon its usual stance of “divide and rule”, i.e. Europe divides itself,
and Russia or China or others rule. Europe must resolutely choose to act as one
united pole in a multi-polar world, including on matters of foreign policy, secu-
rity and defence. Only such a Europe will be relevant to the US and the world.
Such a united EU can build a direct, comprehensive, deepened, and equal
partnership with the US, on all matters of foreign policy, of which NATO is the
technical platform that Washington and Brussels use if they want to act together
militarily. Such a Europe must be much more self-conscious. That means neither
having a position in favour of something simply because e.g. Russia is against
and vice versa, nor being afraid of Russia, but making policy in function of
Europe’s own interests and priorities. That also means therefore not just react-
ing to US policy and either join Washington or watch it – the last couple of years
have seen too many US strategies that have proved directly counter to EU inter-
ests, on Iraq, Afghanistan and the broader Middle Eastern region, on missile
defence, on the Eastern Neighbourhood. On all of these, the EU must continu-
ally define its own priorities and proactively engage US President Barack
Obama.
As Paul-Henri Spaak once said, there are only two types of States in Europe:
small States, and small States that have not yet realized that they are small –
unfortunately the latter category are quite persistent.
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Institutionalizing the Strategic Debate
The 2008 debate has been useful at least in the sense that it forced all actors
involved to think once again about the strategic-level issues, for which the pres-
sure of current events does not always allow. In 2003, the EU discovered how
to make a strategy in the first place; in 2008, the EU started to discover how to
wage a strategic debate and review. Perhaps the strategic debate and the evalu-
ation of EU policy could be more institutionalized.
Because it encompasses the whole of foreign policy, the ESS could provide the
framework for a regular comprehensive assessment, across the pillars, e.g. every
5 years. In every field of foreign policy, the policy documents could be listed as
well as the actions undertaken to implement them, including an assessment of
their effectiveness. Such a systematic review process would provide additional
focus for the various EU entities that are involved in policy planning, while it
could stimulate strategic debate in political bodies such as the Political and Secu-
rity Committee. Prepared by the relevant actors in the Council and Commission
administration, such a high-level political debate could take place under the
aegis of the “High Representative-plus” and the External Action Service, which
would ensure a focus on the interests of the EU as such and on the holistic
approach. But the debate should also involve the European Parliament, and
could include seminars engaging academia, think tanks and the media as well as
national and EU policy-makers. This would constitute a true strategic review,
i.e. a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of actual policies in all areas cov-
ered by the ESS, from aid and trade, democracy and human rights promotion,
to diplomacy and the military. This would also allow the EU to identify in which
areas the ESS has not yet been translated into “sub-strategies”, policies and
actions, as well as in which cases its policies in one area are contradictory to
those in another.
Conclusion
2009 will be an important year for makers of strategy. President Obama will
undoubtedly task the elaboration of a new National Security Strategy. At the
NATO Summit in April, it is generally expected that the drafting of a new Stra-
tegic Concept will be tasked. If it wants its interests and priorities to be taken
into account, the EU must make sure to have its voice heard. The Report on the
implementation of the ESS is important in this regard – but it should be the start
rather than the end of a process. On the basis of the work done, the next Euro-
pean Council should identify the priority areas in which action plans have to be
EUROPE: A TIME FOR STRATEGY
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drawn up to improve implementation, or “sub-strategies” elaborated to steer
policy, with follow-up assured at the next meeting of the Heads of State and
Government. A continually proactive stance must follow.
“Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free”, reads the opening
sentence of the ESS. Viewed in the light of Europe’s history, that statement still
holds true today. Five years on, the opening sentence of the Report states that
“the European Union carries greater responsibilities than at any time in its his-
tory”. That statement too is true.
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The Case for an EU Grand Strategy
JOLYON HOWORTH
The European Union needs to be in a position to play its full role on the
international stage (Saint-Malo Declaration 4 December 1998).
The Stakes
Sixty years after the founding of NATO, twenty years after the fall of the Berlin
Wall, ten years after Saint-Malo, and five years after the publication of the Euro-
pean Security Strategy (ESS), it is high time for the EU to focus properly on the
implications of that key phrase from the Saint-Malo declaration. What is the
“international stage”? What would a “full role” entail for the EU? And what
would be required for it to “be in a position” to do so? To date, despite signifi-
cant progress in the development and implementation of ESDP, and despite a
full year’s “debate” (throughout 2008) over the implementation of the ESS, the
EU has still not really begun to address these key questions. The 2003 document
focused on responding to security challenges posed by “new” threats such as
terrorism, WMD, regional conflicts and organized crime. It saw the EU response
overwhelmingly in terms of crisis management, international institutions, mul-
tilateralism, improved governance and development aid. It did not attempt to
analyze the emerging centres of strategic power in the 21st century world, or to
probe the shifting dynamics of an embryonic multi-polar system. It made no
effort to apprehend the shifts in strategic ambition which were already becom-
ing apparent among a new range of global players (China, India, Brazil, Russia,
South Africa), instead comforting itself with the reassuring notion of multiple
partnerships. It failed to ask questions about the essential collective interests of
the EU’s Member States, particularly in terms of their ongoing access to the vital
arteries of global trade: sea-lanes, strategic choke-points, energy pipelines.
Although the ESS did note that the EU had become a global player, its gaze
rarely rose above its near neighbourhood and hinterland. Above all, in asserting
its need for military power, the Union cautiously framed this in terms of regional
crisis management and humanitarian intervention rather than in terms of stra-
tegic need or direction. The development of crisis management instruments is
essential and urgent. But it does not constitute a strategy.
The December 2008 Report on the Implementation of the ESS recognizes that,
over the preceding five years, the threats facing the EU have become “increas-
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ingly complex”, that “we must be ready to shape events” by “becoming more
strategic in our thinking”, and that this will involve being “more effective and
visible around the world”. Yet, disappointingly, the report makes no effort to
outline what these laudable ambitions might require or how they could be
achieved.
This cannot continue. The EU did not develop ESDP because two statesmen met
in a seaside town and came up with a good idea. ESDP is directly driven by shifts
in history’s tectonic plates – 9 November 1989, 11 September 2001, 7 August
2008. The world is reconfiguring itself constantly in response to those dates and
events. Europe no longer figures on the radar screen of US strategic priorities
except as a potential partner in distant theatres. China, India, Japan and South
Korea are jostling for control of the crucial “Rimland” running from the Suez
Canal to Shanghai through which a huge proportion of EU commercial shipping
passes.6 The very fact that the EU has recently launched the EU NAVFOR mis-
sion off the coast of Somalia is a tacit recognition of the strategic threat to the
Union’s commercial sea-lanes posed by the growing chaos in the Indian Ocean.
The African continent, so long seen as “Europe’s back yard”, is now host to new
strategic players, including both local ones – South Africa, Nigeria – and distant
ones – China, India and increasingly the US. Russia, for twenty years an absen-
tee at the global strategic table, re-emerged with a vengeance in summer 2008,
a newly determined player in the 21st century “great game”. Regional powers in
areas of vital interest to the EU – the Middle East, South Asia, Central and South
America – are asserting themselves in ways which cannot be ignored. In the EU’s
near abroad (Balkans, Mediterranean, Caucasus) the Union is likely to find itself
increasingly alone in the management of strategic challenges. The Georgian War
of 2008 demonstrated that NATO has real politico-strategic limits and is now
more of a problem in Eastern Europe than a solution; that the US has played an
increasingly detached role in the border-land between Europe and Russia; and
that the EU has little choice but to assume leadership in this sensitive part of the
planet. The world may not yet be recognizable as a meaningful multi-polar sys-
tem, but it is well on the way to becoming one.7 The EU member-states individ-
ually – even the large and extrovert ones – cannot hope to weigh in on this new
strategic chess-board without harnessing the collective muscle of their Union
partners. The future will be dominated by large, strategic players.
6. James Rogers, From Suez to Shanghai: the future of European Union geo-strategy. Paris, EUISS,
Occasional Paper (forthcoming). 
7. NIC, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World. Washington DC, 2008, http://www.dni.gov/
nic/NIC_2025_project.html. See also Nicole Gnesotto and Giovanni Grevi, The New Global Puz-
zle. What World for Europe in 2025. Paris, EUISS, 2006. 
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The EU therefore has no historical alternative but to develop its strategic vision
as fast and as far as it can. Over the past ten years, official self-congratulation
about ESDP has sat uncomfortably with the reality that progress has been min-
imal – and above all blind, in the sense of lacking any clear strategic vision.
While the technical, financial and managerial challenges have proven tricky but
resolvable, the key problem has remained political. The EU’s Member States
now need to grasp the political nettle and face up to their historic collective
responsibilities instead of continuing to fiddle individually while Lisbon and
Brussels burn.
I have been one of those who has consistently argued that we cannot expect
miracles overnight, that ESDP will develop incrementally, that the EU has actu-
ally achieved a great deal in a short space of time, that it did not matter that
France and the UK seemed to be pursuing ESDP for contradictory reasons – as
long as they were clearly committed to it.8 It is time to come clean: with a few
honourable exceptions, the record, ten years on, is very meagre. Capacity trans-
formation from legacy systems to usable instruments is deplorably slow.
Deployment ratios are embarrassingly low. Delays and lack of cooperation and
commitment are prejudicial to the EU’s credibility, let alone its effectiveness.
And the incompatible world-views in London and Paris have become a real
problem. This simply cannot go on. There are many very constructive sugges-
tions for improvement. Nick Witney, Bastian Giegerich, Alexander Nicoll, Jean-
Pierre Maulny, Fabio Liberti, Daniel Keohane, Tomas Valasek and others have
generated a mass of entirely realistic proposals.9 The issue is to implement them.
But the problem remains overwhelmingly political.
The Political Challenge
The EU urgently needs a “grand strategy”, defined by Yale historian John Gad-
dis as “the calculated relationship between means and large ends”. This involves
several key requirements, many of which run totally counter to the collaborative
8. Jolyon Howorth, Security and Defence Policy in the European Union. London, Palgrave, 2007.
9. Nick Witney, Re-Energising Europe’s Security and Defence Policy, Report. European Council on
Foreign Relations, 2008: http://ecfr.eu/page/-/documents/ESDP-report.pdf; Bastian Giegerich,
European Military Capabilitie: Building Armed Forces for Modern Operations, London, Interna-
tional Institute for Strategic Studies, 2008 ; Alexander Nicoll, “The long hard slog of strengthening
Europe’s defence capabilities”, Europe’s World, Autumn 2008; Bastian Giegerich, European Mili-
tary Crisis Management: connecting ambition and reality, London, IISS, 2008 (Adelphi Paper #
397); Jean-Pierre Maulny & Fabio Liberti, Pooling of EU Member States’ Assets in the Implemen-
tation of ESDP, European Parliament Directorate General External Policies of the Union, March
2008: http://www.isis-europe.org/pdf/2008_artrel_142_08-02epstudy-pooling.pdf; Daniel Keo-
hane & Tomas Valasek, Willing and Able: EU Defence in 2020. London, CER, 2008. 
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mode which is the essence of EU decision-making. Grand strategy requires the
sort of intuitive overview which rarely occurs in EU settings.10 It runs counter
to the specialization logic which underpins much of the activity of EU officials
and institutions – the ever greater mastery of highly focused dossiers. Grand
strategy must be based on the extraction of key but limited information from a
large range of sources and its quasi-instinctive (rather than scientific or system-
atic) evaluation. Secondly, grand strategy demands the type of bold decision-
taking and implementation from which Europeans generally recoil. The itera-
tions of EU decision-making involve constant weighing of pros and cons, bar-
gains and compromises, a little bit of this for the Greeks and a little bit of that
for the Poles. Grand strategy, on the other hand, means fixing on an objective
and sticking to it. At the same time, and somewhat paradoxically, a strategic
approach must know how to respond to the unexpected. This requires agile
leadership rather than iterative deliberations seeking common denominators.
Leadership itself needs to transcend bargains and compromises and to demon-
strate that followers are willing, indeed happy to be led. This again is foreign to
the EU experience which goes to extraordinary lengths to incorporate the view-
points of everybody, even of those who are hostile. And finally, grand strategy
requires great discourse. From Pericles to Churchill, great leaders have known
how to use words to transform strategic reality. And because words speak to the
emotions, there tends to have to be an identity component in the magic. No EU
leader has so far asked its citizens to go “once more unto the breach”.
At this point, many will say “then let’s forget about grand strategy for the EU
will never achieve it!” But, as the 21st century unfolds, such an attitude will
increasingly condemn the EU to marginality in international affairs. Europe suf-
fers from major handicaps in the emerging international pecking order: demo-
graphic decline, limited natural resources, geographical exiguity, military inad-
equacy. For the Union deliberately to add political fissiparousness to that list
would seem perverse. The “debate” over “normative power Europe”11 is over.
ESDP now exists and is not about to go away. The power of example, commit-
ment to international institutions, diplomatic solutions, multilateralism and law,
the assertion of moral precepts, the primacy of human security and many other
EU normative principles are valid and important. But they should be incorpo-
rated within a grand strategy, not proclaimed as an alternative to one. Robert
Cooper warned back in 2003 that “there is a zone of safety in Europe and out-
side it a zone of danger and chaos. […] Those who want to have a chance of
10. The remarks that follow are adapted from John Gaddis’s lecture at Middlebury College, Ver-
mont (16 May 2005) on “Why Grand Strategy is Tough for Academics”. 
11. Karen Smith, European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity, 2008;
Ian Manners, Europe and the World. London, Palgrave, 2009; Mario Telo, Europe: a Civilian
Power?: European Union, Global Governance, World Order. London, Palgrave, 2006. 
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surviving an uncertain future should think in terms of arming and organizing to
face it, while at the same time working for lasting political solutions. In a
dynamic world, the worst policy is to do nothing”.12 The time has come for the
EU to think constructively in terms of power relations – what is the nature of
power in the world today, how is its definition shifting, who wields it, what
strategic objectives should the 27 aim for through the application of power in
all its guises, in alliance or in partnership with whom, through the deployment
of precisely which range of instruments? These are the questions at the heart of
a grand strategic approach which the EU will ignore at its peril. How could the
Member States set about the implementation of such an approach?
The Way Forward
The EU cannot devise a grand strategy as long as there is fundamental disagree-
ment about what the EU actually is and what it should be doing in the world. It
was once a source of Euro-congratulation that France and the UK, at Saint-
Malo, had jointly kick-started ESDP. Today, the comparison is startling. In the
June 2008 French Livre Blanc, the EU framework for French defence and secu-
rity thinking is not only omnipresent, it is structurally fundamental. Explicitly,
the security of France and the security of Europe are considered to be cotermin-
ous. ESDP is a strategy. In the UK’s March 2008 document, The National Secu-
rity Strategy of the UK, the acronym ESDP does not appear once and the all too
few – and fleeting – references to Europe and to the EU are usually situated
within a list of potential security collaborators for the UK, beginning with the
US and the UN. The EU usually comes third. The UK’s approach to ESDP seems
increasingly anti-strategic. 2008 also saw the launch of the first ever Security
Strategy for Germany impelled by the perceived need to clarify the strategic
thinking behind the increasing deployment of Bundeswehr troops on overseas
missions.
It would therefore seem appropriate, in the first instance, to organize (in camera
with no media presence) a trilateral summit between France, Germany and the
UK to thrash out precisely where each of the three now stands in relation to the
emerging new world order, to ESDP, to NATO and to the relationship between
them. This conference should involve representatives from all political parties as
well as key officials. The agenda should be exclusively focused on the question
of whether each of these key nations can hope to achieve its broad strategic
objectives without framing them primarily within an EU context. The aim
12. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century. New
York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003, pp. 55 & 171. 
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should be to develop a trilateral draft Security Strategy document, combining
the compatible features of the three recent papers. The Brown-Sarkozy summit
on 27 March 2008 managed to generate some degree of commonality of pur-
pose.13 At the macro-level, Paris and London claim to “share a common analysis
of the organisation of the 21st century international order” and boast proactive
plans for international development and the resolution of international crises.
At the European level, the picture is more sober. The main motivation for coop-
eration is clearly financial rather than political or strategic. Opposition to ESDP
among Tory MPs14 (though not, it seems, among the UK public15) appears to be
growing. The UK therefore faces a fundamental challenge. If the British cannot
sign up, then France, Germany, Italy, Poland and Spain should not hesitate to
take a joint lead in a similar exercise. Once the major EU Member States have
embarked on a joint strategic approach to the rest of the world, the UK will
eventually come around (as it always has in the past).
The second step should be to convene a special EU Council meeting to activate
the strategic reorganization of ESDP. The EU can never hope to be a strategic
actor of the same type as unitary states like the US, China or Russia. But, once
broad agreement has been reached on strategic objectives, it can do a much
better job of organizing the inputs of its Member States in accordance with their
overall capacity and special resources. The reality is that the 27 Member States
currently belong to five different divisions in terms of foreign and security policy
inputs and capacity. This should be formally recognized and synergies developed
within these divisions in order to maximize output and to task the respective
Member States with different political challenges and objectives with a view to
consolidating ESDP.
The various recent analyses of ESDP commitments referred to above suggest the
following de facto breakdown:
– Division 1: UK, France
– Division 2: Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Poland, Finland,
Czech Republic
– Division 3: Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia
– Division 4: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Ireland, Latvia, Hungary, Lithuania,
Portugal
– Division 5: Cyprus, Luxemburg, Malta
13. Joint UK-France Summit Declaration, 27 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/bsp/hi/
pdfs/27_03_08communique.pdf. 
14. See Liam Fox, “Britain, Europe and NATO: Heading in the wrong direction”, 31 January
2008, http://www.conservatives.com/tile.do?def=news.story.page&obj_id=142045&speeches=1. 
15. According to Eurobarometer #67 (November 2007), p.149, 56% of UK respondents are in
favour of “a common defence and security policy among EU member states”, http://ec.europa.eu/
public_opinion/archives/eb/eb67/eb67_en.pdf. 
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The first two divisions should concentrate on their interrelations with one
another, and should design bilateral or multilateral areas for cooperation and
rationalization. The third and fourth divisions need to focus single-mindedly on
sharing, pooling and specialization along the lines of the Maulny/Liberti pro-
posals. Division 5 needs to identify niche capacities. Agreement is needed on the
best ways of rationalizing procurement, planning, budgets, pooling, sharing,
specialization. Targets need setting for budgetary rationalization: within 5 years,
30% of spending should be tied in to pooling, sharing, specialization arrange-
ments; within 10 years, 50% etc. Preparations should go ahead for the drafting
of a specifically European White Book on Security and Defence.
Thirdly, the European Council should agree on the establishment of an EU Stra-
tegic Advisory Body, similar in conception to the US National Security Council,
whose task would be to feed strategic advice to the new officials appointed
under the Lisbon Treaty (the Irish hiatus is simply a hiatus…), particularly the
High-Representative and the European President but also the President of the
Commission. Fourthly, there is an urgent need for the creation of a Council of
Defence Ministers – as proposed by the recent French Presidency. Nick Witney
has formulated a set of cogent and detailed proposals for the work of such a
body, which one can only wholeheartedly endorse.16 In addition, the new Coun-
cil, in association with the EUMS, should concentrate on the “Comprehensive
Approach” to a Single Planning and Conduct Capability synergizing the strate-
gic and operational planning requirements of both civilian and military assets
deployable under ESDP.
Fifthly, resolution of the ESDP-NATO stand-off is long overdue. All of the insti-
tutional and political suggestions of the recent French Presidency are construc-
tive and important. If necessary, the EU should associate Georgia and Ukraine
(in the same way as Turkey) with the ESDP/PSC/EDA policy processes. This
should be complemented by the creation of an EU Caucus in NATO – as pro-
posed by a recent policy paper.17 This will reflect the growing reality that, until
there is agreement within the EU, there can only be blockage in NATO. There
may still be blockage thereafter, but that is another issue. At the same time, the
EU should press for the creation of a direct interagency EU-US Council or
Forum to engage in permanent strategic discussions with American friends &
partners across the entire range of policy issues from climate change to agricul-
tural subsidies. NATO can no longer act as the agency of choice for the manage-
ment of transatlantic relations.
16. Witney, loc.cit., pp. 32-36.
17. Daniel Fiott, “France’s rapprochement with NATO: Paving the Way for an EU Caucus?”,
European Security Review #40, September 2008. 
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Finally, free-riders in European security terms should be identified and called
upon to account for themselves. Since it is manifestly absurd for the EU-27 to
be attempting to run 27 armies, 23 air-forces and 20 navies, a collective assess-
ment of these forces and expenditures seems long overdue. Why, for instance,
do so many countries need to have a national air-force (as opposed to a joint
one, shared with neighbours or with others)? What could their “national” forces
actually succeed in doing – against which air-borne adversary? And since such
questions are being asked, why not push the logic a little further and ask why
the EU could not agree to generate a single European air-space protection force,
with common procurement, common training and common planning? Coun-
tries with a land-border with Russia can be forgiven for continuing to wish to
emphasize territorial defence. But would it not make more sense for the forces
of Finland, Estonia and Latvia to be reinforced by contingents from other EU
Member States?
These are simply a number of ideas in order to launch a process. Let us imagine
a “best case” communiqué following the Franco-Anglo-German summit sug-
gested above. What should it contain? At the strategic level, it should refer to
the EU’s need to develop a genuine security strategy, laying out its own collective
strategic ambitions in the security and defence field, and the way in which those
ambitions mesh with or complement those of the US, NATO and other allies and
strategic partners, as well as the way they might hope to manage relations with
perceived rivals or challengers. It should re-examine the meaning, ten years after
Saint-Malo, of the key concept of European autonomy, stressing that this does
not imply, first and foremost, independence from the US for its own sake (as a
political objective or a principle) but rather a state of non-dependency (as an
outcome) which would allow the EU to act as a better ally and not to continue
to act as a brake on the US’s own strategic ambitions. There should be agree-
ment to consider the EU as a strategic actor with a remit covering the “far
abroad” – the Mediterranean and most of the African continent; the Mashrek
and the Levant – meaning Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, the Gulf and the South
Caucasus and above all the maritime “Rimland” running from Suez to Shang-
hai. A summit agreement should also state unambiguously the intention of all
three governments to maximise the potential of the CFSP/ESDP provisions in the
Lisbon Treaty by vowing to work together to make sure that, irrespective of
nationality, the best individuals are appointed to the new top jobs, and by
resolving at institutional level potential clashes of “turf”. It should include a
rehearsal of the assets which a robust EU, blessed with a buoyant ESDP, might
bring to the transatlantic table: commitment to resolution of regional crises in
Africa; a new impetus – and new cash – for the Middle East peace process; a
drive for a new type of EU involvement in Afghanistan; fresh thinking on the
requirements for a breakthrough in the Iranian impasse; a new initiative on
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counter-terrorism; and many other things. It should also capitalise on the real
ESDP progress made under the French presidency with some more robust state-
ment of improved and workable mechanisms for generating European military
capacity, including targets for defence spending, pooling, rationalisation,
deployability, sustainability. And it should feature an agreed statement on the
ways in which permanent structured cooperation can be made to work in the
interests of the EU collectively as well as in those of its Member States.
Are these things so difficult to imagine? Many of them are already either being
discussed or actually set in motion. A grand strategic approach essentially
requires their coordination and synergised implementation. Such an ambition is
not beyond the EU. The challenge is to do it.

25
Military Capabilities: Time for Capitals to Act
BASTIAN GIEGERICH18
Decisions to improve capabilities are made not by the EU or NATO, but by
individual governments. All governments have undertaken defence reforms, but
their efforts have been constrained by budget cuts, by the natural resistance of
defence establishments to change, and most importantly by a lack of clarity
about what constitutes the most effective shape for the nation’s armed forces in
an era of multinational operations of many different types. Within the frame-
work of ESDP, headline goals have been defined and revised, progress assessed,
shortfalls identified, and programmes initiated to remedy them. Extremely
detailed military planning has been conducted in Brussels and a basic notion of
what the EU and its Member States intend to do with improved capabilities
exists, not the least in the guise of the European Security Strategy (ESS). In gen-
eral, an overarching goal of all this activity and effort has been to generate capa-
bilities among EU Member States that strengthen their capacity to conduct inter-
national crisis management missions. Nonetheless, as has often been observed,
EU Member States seem to be unable to live up to their aspirations. Currently
some 4% of all active armed forces of EU Member States are deployed on inter-
national operations. Hardly a number that impresses given the ambition
expressed in the ESS. However, progress will not come from yet another round
of goals defined at the EU level, but, rather, from difficult decisions being taken
in EU Member State capitals.
Several developments in 2008 have revealed a willingness to search for prag-
matic solutions. As holder of the rotating EU Presidency in the second half of
2008, France has pressed other members to focus anew on creating better capa-
bilities for crisis management operations and stepping up coordination to
achieve these. For example, plans were advanced to coordinate maintenance and
use of transport aircraft, satellite intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance,
and to carry out joint exercises of EU countries with aircraft carriers (France,
Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom). One example of possible progress is that
Paris and London have been pushing for a fund to pay for upgrades of helicop-
ters – as well as training – so that they can be more easily deployed over a wider
range of terrains as part of NATO, EU or United Nations missions. The fund
18. This article is based on a recent IISS dossier written and edited by Bastian Giegerich and Alex-
ander Nicoll, Director of Editorial, IISS: European Military Capabilities: Building Armed Forces
for Modern Operations. London, IISS, 2008, http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/
european-military-capabilities/. 
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recently had its first expenditure when it contributed to the costs for upgrading
Czech transport helicopters to be deployed to Afghanistan.19
A European Council declaration on strengthening capabilities of December
2008 offers clarification of the EU’s level of ambition as far as the range and
number of missions to be conducted under ESDP is concerned. The document
also announced a fresh round of capability initiatives ranging from force projec-
tion, information gathering and space-based intelligence, and force protection
to interoperability issues. Importantly, the declaration explicitly calls for the
sharing and pooling of national capabilities as well as for voluntary specialisa-
tion on niche capabilities and collective procurement – this signifies a clear
emphasis on non-traditional ways of creating and maintaining capabilities.20
Notwithstanding this undeniable dynamic, decisions on what capabilities to
retain or develop will depend on each nation’s distinct view on the role it should
take in multinational efforts to address modern threats. Since contemporary
threats in general do not appear to pose existential risks, the use of force and its
place in the overall spectrum of means is discretionary.21 Some countries will be
far more ambitious than others. At one extreme, only comparatively large coun-
tries such as France and the United Kingdom can aspire to capabilities giving
them strategic influence as well as tactical and operational weight. At the other,
decisions on capabilities by small countries will be a function partly of the
national threat perspective and partly of the degree of desire to play a role as a
member of the EU, NATO or another grouping such as NATO’s Partnership for
Peace.
In practice, while decisions on future capabilities remain separate and national,
they are heavily influenced by commitments to international operations that
governments expect to undertake. There is a common understanding that the
requirement for deployable troops is not likely to be temporary. An EU Long
Term Vision document drawn up by the European Defence Agency (EDA) in
2006 expected that deployments over strategic distances and to austere environ-
ments would be required, including scenarios that would require a substantial
level of force. Even in the context of the EU’s European Security and Defence
Policy (ESDP), generally assumed to encompass crisis response involving ‘softer’
19. See: Gregorz Holdanowicz, “Czech Mi-171Sh upgrades herald helo initiative”. In: Jane’s
Defence Review, 7 January 2009, p. 11.
20. Council of the European Union, Declaration on Strengthening Capabilities. Brussels, 11
December 2008.
21. Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 379. Abingdon,
Routledge for the IISS, 2006, p. 7; Paul T. Mitchell, Network Centric Warfare. Coalition Opera-
tions in the Age of US Military Primacy, Adelphi Paper 385. Abingdon, Routledge for the IISS,
2006, pp. 18–19.
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military operations than NATO, military actions could thus be of high inten-
sity.22 If these collective expectations are correct, there will be continuing and
repeated demands on European militaries to contribute to multinational forces,
whether configured by NATO or the EU or as coalitions. Each force will require
a specific set of capabilities, depending on the precise mission, its duration, size,
circumstances, location and terrain – and importantly, on the capabilities of any
opposing forces.
What Progress Has Been Made?
How close are Europe’s military capabilities to meeting the demands of today
and tomorrow? Capabilities comprise the assets and skills that nations can bring
to bear to counter identified threats and to meet responsibilities. The only way
to assess capabilities is nation by nation, since armed forces, budgets, threat
assessments and deployment decisions all remain national.
Whatever common yardsticks are applied, there will always be an element of
subjectivity. However, EU Member States are making advances in shaping their
armed forces for the multinational operations in which they are increasingly
being asked to take part. Governments have been deploying more troops over-
seas, as well as committing military assets to new multinational forces available
for rapid deployment. Moreover, each country has given thought to the level and
nature of activity that it is willing to undertake as part of efforts to shore up
international security in the face of diverse and far-flung threats. All have under-
taken defence reforms to replace the outdated military structures of the Cold
War, albeit on the basis of reduced defence budgets. Overall, the picture is one
of qualified progress.
It is also clear that much more could be done to modernise Europe’s armed
forces so that they have more personnel to deal with the world’s problems and
become better equipped, better able to operate alongside each other and non-
European allies, more fitted to their missions and more cost-effective for the
taxpayer. European countries would be more effective actors on the world stage
if they were able to formulate a common vision of threats and the means to deal
with them, and if they were able to resolve the squabbles that prevent NATO
and the EU from working together. To a large extent, this would require the
biggest countries, which account for a high proportion of European defence
spending, to forge a new compact and to have the energy to implement it.
22. European Defence Agency, An Initial Long-Term Vision for European Defence Capability and
Capacity Needs. Brussels: EDA, 2006.
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In addition to deploying more troops, Europe has achieved global reach: the fact
that NATO operates far from Europe in Afghanistan, and the EU in Africa, is
no longer the subject of debate. In spite of transport shortfalls that are being
remedied, European countries plainly can sustain missions that are well “out-of
area”. However, only a small proportion of Europe’s active-duty personnel are
available for foreign deployments. The average percentage of deployed land
forces remains well below the modest usability target set by NATO (and
accepted by the EU), despite a reduction in size of most militaries. In this regard,
European armed forces (with some exceptions) are clearly unable to live up to
the goals expressed by their governments.
In addition to having global reach, the operations in which European countries
are now participating tend to have several characteristics in common: they are
almost all multinational; they often begin by requiring deployments at short
notice; they have narrowly defined objectives; they involve a wide range of
tasks; and they are often of long duration. This places specific demands on the
countries involved: they must have deployable forces; the forces must be able to
operate together; rapid-reaction forces must be available; forces must have a
high degree of flexibility and operational effectiveness; and deployments must
be sustainable.
Past operations have exposed shortfalls in all these areas, and governments have
sought to devise collective mechanisms, through the EU and NATO, to fill the
gaps. However, while these initiatives have been valuable in identifying neces-
sary improvements, they have been only partially successful in achieving them.
This may be attributed again to the highly national orientation of decisions that
affect defence capabilities. Be it NATO or the EU, collective defence and force
planning processes do not add up to a capabilities development process.
At best, collective aspirations can begin to penetrate national assumptions over
time – the reality is that defence budgets of EU Member States are planned out
for some more years to come and there is limited room for manoeuvre. Thus,
the collective tapestry of Europe’s strengths that can be woven by aggregating
national assets into a European whole can easily unravel when individual
national capabilities are scrutinised. The Capabilities Development Plan,
launched by the EDA in July 2008, will seek to mitigate this challenge by helping
participating Member States to develop their national plans in accordance with
ambitions and available resources and also by facilitating the exploitation of
multinational cooperation by providing data to Member States about what is
going on in other Member States. It is thus a potentially very important tool for
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Member States as they move towards a more defined capability development
process.23
A key determinant of a nation’s capabilities is the role it wants to play in
addressing international threats. A country’s level of ambition (in the military
sense) is a function of its broader goals, which in turn are shaped by many fac-
tors: history, geography, military traditions, politics, demographics, foreign pol-
icy, threat perceptions, membership of international organisations, and eco-
nomic and financial strength. Most European countries, facing demands for
expeditionary forces, have attempted to set goals for the operational capacity of
their armed forces and to carry out defence reforms.
European countries, if they meet their expressed targets, will steadily increase
the military assets available for international operations, so that their collective
capabilities will by 2015 be significantly greater than those available today.
However, the ability of governments to set precise targets for the size, capabili-
ties, frequency and concurrency of deployments varies widely, and there is scope
for considerable improvements in the clarity of expressed levels of military
ambition.
Realising expressed ambitions requires an effective process of defence reform,
backed by political will. All EU Member States continue to be in a state of tran-
sition, and all are seeking to do more with less: that is, they are attempting to
create effective, usable, flexible capabilities out of forces that, in many countries,
have little or no operational experience. To achieve this, defence ministries must
manage with smaller resources than those previously allotted to essentially static
forces. Defence reform is therefore extremely challenging, requiring politically
difficult choices. Reform that is effective, in the sense of enabling successful
expeditionary operations, is not just a matter for defence ministries: it requires
the support of finance ministries, as well as those government departments
involved in security more generally. Crucially, it involves close coordination
with departments responsible for providing aid and civilian assistance to com-
plement the military aspect of modern missions. Military involvement in trou-
bled situations will rarely achieve a solution by itself.
The size and composition of defence spending is one of the key factors that
determine a country’s ability to take part in operations. There has been a steady
real-terms decline in European defence spending, which now accounts for a far
smaller proportion of national economies than it did during the Cold War. Some
governments have recently increased spending to help finance reforms and the
23. See: European Defence Agency, Background Note – Capability Development Plan, 8 July 2008. 
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development of new capabilities. However, the available data indicate that there
is an imbalance in most countries’ spending, with too much being spent to main-
tain existing military infrastructure through personnel costs, and too little on
investment in modern equipment and, in particular, research into future technol-
ogies. An additional factor is that, while some countries pay for operations from
special allotments of money from central-government contingency funds, a sig-
nificant number pay for them out of defence budgets. This restricts budget fund-
ing for the reforms that are necessary to enable armed forces to participate in
operations, and to be effective when deployed. Thus, there is considerable scope
for defence budgets to be spent more effectively, and to deliver better value to
the taxpayer.
There is also scope to develop stronger industrial capabilities, to deliver better
value, and to equip armed forces with what they need for today’s operations in
a timelier manner. Demand remains fragmented, with most procurement still
carried out by nations acting alone. As a consequence, the supplier base is also
fragmented, even though companies have expanded across borders. The onus is
primarily on governments to take steps to harmonise their equipment require-
ments. It is not suggested that countries will have the same requirements, since
each carries out an individual set of expeditionary roles. However, it is clear that
greater coordination of needs and programme timescales is possible – this is
increasingly being recognized as exemplified by the decision of seven EU Mem-
ber States (Finland, France, Germany, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) to
begin work on the development of a Future Unmanned Aerial System based on
common requirements.24 At the same time, it is important that barriers to intra-
European cross-border trade in defence items continue to be lowered as is the
goal of the directive on intra-EU transfers of defence products. This initiative,
likely to become EU law in 2009, would mean that EU Member States would
stop to consider each other as third countries when it comes to defence related
products.25 Greater cooperation would enable industry to shape itself more
effectively to meet customer demand. Given reasonable clarity in the future
equipment programmes of major nations, private companies can be expected to
create, through business decisions, the most effective industrial structure.
For political reasons, governments tend to retain expensive ‘legacy’ programmes
that produce equipment that may not be of the highest priority for modern mis-
sions. Procurement programmes need, therefore, to be scrutinised to ensure that
they are in tune with defence goals and operational needs. The sheer slowness
24. European Defence Agency, European Air Transport Fleet Launched, Press Release, 10 Novem-
ber 2008, p. 2.
25. Brooks Tigner, “EU set to simplify cross-border transfer of defence products”. In: Jane’s
Defence Review, 7 January 2009, p. 11. 
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of procurement processes exacerbates the problem, with costly programmes
begun during the Cold War still using up large shares of acquisition budgets.
This limits the amount that can be spent on technologies that could quickly
enhance operational capabilities.
An important element of effectiveness in dealing with international threats is the
ability to deploy military force rapidly – ideally to prevent a minor, localised
problem from becoming a larger, long-term crisis. European countries, and
Europe collectively, will have more influence as strategic actors if they have a
rapid reaction capability and can be seen as ready to use it. While individual
countries and NATO already had capabilities in this area, the development of
the NATO Response Force (even though it has not attained commitment tar-
gets) and of the EU Battlegroups are important steps forward in this regard. It
is also vital that capabilities, once built, are tested. However, their creation has
a purpose that goes beyond the capacity for rapid reaction: it also acts as a
stimulus for military reform, particularly for smaller countries for which even a
contribution to an EU Battlegroup would represent a substantial commitment.
The final determinant of a country’s capabilities is its willingness to use them.
While leaders may collectively agree that an international military operation is
required, their own decision to take part is a separate matter. To a large extent,
decisions come down to politics, both domestic and international. Many oper-
ations are uncontroversial, while others require a case to be made by govern-
ments if they wish to take part. In most cases, domestic political debates in Euro-
pean countries have resulted in decisions to deploy troops to international oper-
ations. But politics is unpredictable, and the factors that shape political
decisions go far beyond the world of defence. Similarly, the political will to sus-
tain a deployment cannot be precisely measured, and can easily evaporate.
Time for Tough Decisions
A rise in demand for military operations and a fall in resources to fund armed
forces mean the day has long gone when European countries could afford to
maintain large, static military establishments. Whatever the threat perceptions,
strategic positions and ambitions of each nation – and it is acknowledged that
these will differ widely across the continent – European countries must have
usable armed forces. The uses to which they are put will vary enormously, from
providing humanitarian assistance to undertaking combat operations, as in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
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It is not self-evident that the capabilities of European countries fall well below
their own strategic needs. European countries must make their own assessments
of what they need from their militaries; the United States is not their benchmark.
However, it is vital that European nations take the necessary steps to put their
own assessments and policies into practice: to match their capabilities to the
dangers against which they wish to guard, and the roles that they want to play.
First, it is obvious that, in spite of reforms intended to improve force-projection
capacities, the proportion of armed forces available for use in international mis-
sions remains low. Why should it be acceptable that any part of a nation’s armed
forces cannot be put to use to deal with the principal threats that nations com-
monly identify? The taxpayer seems entitled to expect that armed forces should
be usable and it seems that it is time for a change in mindset where it is the large
share of forces that seems unusable under current circumstances that needs to
be justified and not a government’s attempt to increase the share of useable
forces. To state this recommendation more neutrally, more effort should be
made by individual governments to adapt force structures to the threats and
purposes that are expressed in their policy documents.
Second, given the very wide range of capabilities that are needed for the multi-
national operations in which European countries participate, more thought
needs to be given to how Europe collectively can provide them on a reliable
basis. While infantry soldiers may be plentiful, those with more specialist skills
are not. However, decisions to supply specific “niche” capabilities and to dis-
pense with others can be sensitive for governments, which are always conscious
of their responsibility for national security. The practical way to approach this
issue may be for governments to come to bilateral or “small group” arrange-
ments – rather than attempting large-scale (and potentially elusive) agreements
in NATO and the EU – so that all required capabilities are available for opera-
tions without compromising national security.
Third, the capabilities required to achieve success in future operations will not
just be of the military variety. Civil actors – local and international, official and
non-governmental – will be involved in solving international crises. Govern-
ments need to ensure that these non-military capabilities are available and prop-
erly coordinated with military activities.
Fourth, governments could spend their defence budgets more efficiently, and
deliver better equipment to the military in a more timely fashion, if they were
able to better manage their procurement programmes. Necessary reforms
include faster acquisition and better coordination with other governments fac-
ing similar requirements. Collaboration has so far been relatively ineffective, but
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is the only means of delivering large-scale capabilities. Without it, governments
duplicate efforts and spend money wastefully. Better coordination on equipment
requirements would enable the supplier base to structure itself more effectively,
delivering further savings to the taxpayer. Building better coordination and a
stronger supplier base does not, however, imply greater protectionism or a “For-
tress Europe”. To have the best forces at the best value, Europe must be open to
all available equipment and technologies.
Fifth, governments should allot a higher proportion of budgets to technological
research. The ability to develop the technologies that will equip tomorrow’s
armed forces will, above all, determine the extent to which European countries
can remain in control of their own destinies. Governments must also strive to
achieve a better balance between personnel and equipment costs when budget-
ing for defence.
Sixth, there can be no effective reshaping of European militaries without clear
goals. It is important that each nation, when determining ambition levels for its
armed forces, set clear targets for such things as the number and types of forces
it wishes to be able to deploy, and the concurrency and sustainability of opera-
tions. This, in turn, will guide decisions on defence budgets, force structures,
equipment programmes and training. When carrying out reforms, it is essential
to focus on capabilities that are required to meet the stated level of ambition and
to dispense with others, though this may necessitate difficult political decisions.
Seventh, it is important that the new rapid reaction capacities of NATO and the
EU are used. If not, the pledges made towards them will be increasingly open to
question. These forces promise to increase Europe’s strategic influence – but
only if they are demonstrated to be real.
Finally, European countries should use more effectively the organisational tools
that they have available to them. NATO and the EU, as well as the United
Nations and ad hoc coalitions, are instruments through which countries pool
their efforts. Two large changes to these organisations have increased Europe’s
capacity to address international threats. These are the expansion of NATO to
include former Soviet-bloc countries, and the extension of the EU’s remit to
include defence. Both were achieved after lengthy debates and in spite of doubts.
Recent experience shows that two additional steps are required to further build
effectiveness. First, the proliferation of national approaches to the use of forces
in Afghanistan illustrates that NATO members urgently need to work more
effectively together and make stronger efforts to develop a shared operational
vision when undertaking challenging missions. Second, governments must stop
assuming that a hierarchy exists under which NATO, with US participation,
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takes on the toughest assignments while the EU undertakes “softer” missions
involving a larger civil element, borrowing assets from NATO if necessary. This
pattern is not firm policy – the EU’s defence mandate includes high-intensity
operations. It is up to political leaders to choose the most appropriate tool to
undertake a particular mission.
What should not be encouraged is any rivalry or lack of communication
between NATO and the defence entities of the EU, organisations which, at the
time of writing, share 21 Member States in common, out of 26 and 27 respec-
tively. These states, whose taxpayers are burdened with the costs of dual
membership, should act to align the two organisations’ forces and mission-plan-
ning processes using each body’s special capacities. These include, for example,
NATO’s well-developed planning processes, and the ability of the European
Defence Agency to bring political impetus to initiatives that could help Europe’s
forces become more effective and deliver better value. The onus is on govern-
ments to make NATO and the EU work together to their collective benefit.
Two EU Member States stand out as strategic powers, capable of significant
individual action. The policy orientations of the United Kingdom and France
will, above all else, determine Europe’s ability to have strong and coherent capa-
bilities in the future. Just as they launched the EU into the defence realm with
their 1998 St-Malo accord, they have it within their power strongly to influence
Europe’s future choices. President Nicolas Sarkozy has made it clear that he
wishes to reinvigorate EU defence efforts, and was expected to introduce new
initiatives during the French rotating EU Presidency in the second half of 2008.
In particular, France said in its June 2008 White Paper that it would encourage
EU members to set more ambitious targets for intervention capabilities, along
the lines of the original EU Headline Goals. Sarkozy has also indicated that he
would like to return France to the NATO integrated command structure, which
it left in 1966. This would increase the potential for better NATO–EU coordi-
nation. However, it was not clear how other EU members – and particularly the
United Kingdom – would respond to new French initiatives.
With Franco-British impetus, European countries could develop capabilities
that would enable Europe to play an effective role in addressing international
crises, at good value to the taxpayer. Without it, progress towards this goal is
likely to remain heavily qualified. Fixing the problems identified will take
national governments making difficult decisions along the lines outlined in this
article – not more progress catalogues or headline goals on the EU level.
